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A Stabilizing Neighbor?
The Impact of China’s Engagement in Central Asia on Regional 
Security
by Luba v. Hauff
Summary / Zusammenfassung
The relationship between Central Asia’s states and their societies is an increasingly 
vital determinant of  regional insecurity. During the past decade, the traditionally 
secular populations’ frustration with their secular governments has increased con-
siderably—and with it, their responsiveness to alternative, Islamic, forms of  social 
and political organization. If  it goes unheeded, this state of  affairs may eventually 
undermine the international community’s security- and state-building efforts in 
Afghanistan. Set against this background and in consideration of  the region’s grow-
ing linkages with its eastern neighbor, this analysis intends to shed light upon the 
role of  China in Central Asia’s state-society relations, to discuss its impact on this 
post-Soviet region’s growing insecurity, and finally, to forge a link between China’s 
neighborhood policy and the security of  the greater Central Asian region after 
2014.
Ein stabilisierender Nachbar?
Auswirkungen des chinesischen Engagements in Zentralasien 
auf die regionale Sicherheit
Die Beziehung zwischen Staat und Gesellschaft hat sich zu einem akuten Unsicher-
heitsfaktor in Zentralasien entwickelt. Im letzten Jahrzehnt hat die Enttäuschung 
der traditionell säkularen Bevölkerung über ihre ebenfalls säkularen Regierungen 
deutlich zugenommen – und somit auch die gesellschaftliche Aufgeschlossenheit 
gegenüber alternativen, islamischen Formen sozialer und politischer Organisa-
tion. Diese Entwicklung hat das Potenzial, die Bemühungen der internationalen 
Gemeinschaft um die Schaffung von Sicherheit und den Aufbau eines funktionie-
renden Staates in Afghanistan zu beeinträchtigen. Vor diesem Hintergrund und 
angesichts der wachsenden Verflechtungen zwischen der postsowjetischen Region 
Zentralasien und der Volksrepublik China verfolgt die vorliegende Analyse das Ziel, 
die Rolle Pekings im zentralasiatischen Staat-Gesellschaft-Geflecht zu beleuchten 
und die sich daraus ergebenden sicherheitspolitischen Schlüsse zu ziehen. Darauf  
aufbauend wird dann die Bedeutung chinesischer Nachbarschaftspolitik für die 
Sicherheitslage der Großregion Zentralasien auch nach 2014 reflektiert.
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Introduction
As the presence of  the NATO-led International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) draws to an end 
in Afghanistan, the spotlight increasingly shifts to 
the regional powers and their role in building and 
ensuring the future stability of  the greater Central 
Asian region. In this regard, Afghanistan’s northern 
neighbors—the five formerly Soviet republics of  
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
and Uzbekistan—as well as China to the northeast, 
are regarded as increasingly vital players. The Cen-
tral Asian states, together with Russia and the Baltic 
states, are part of  the essential Northern Distribu-
tion Network (NDN) through which non-lethal 
equipment such as food, clothing, construction 
materials, and fuel are transported to the coalition 
forces in Afghanistan.1 What is more, the secular-
ized and traditionally moderate Muslim republics 
share century-long ties with Afghanistan, with sig-
nificant numbers of  ethnic Turkmens, Uzbeks and 
Tajiks living across their southern borders. These 
ethnic groups have been among the most resolute 
supporters of  the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance, 
and, according to Oksana Antonenko, “helped to 
drive the [Taliban] regime out of  Afghanistan” in 
the immediate aftermath of  the US-led invasion 
of  the country in 2001.2 China, on the other hand, 
commands significant economic resources that are 
vital for the Afghan postwar reconstruction and 
development. Indeed, Beijing’s extensive potential 
for investing in the country’s raw materials as well 
as in its transport and communications infrastruc-
ture is considered a real opportunity to “divert 
Afghans away from illicit commercial activities such 
as opium production,” among other things.3 Thus, 
as the deadline for ISAF-withdrawal approaches 
and the international community’s relationship with 
Afghanistan’s southern neighbors, Iran and Pakistan, 
continuously deteriorates, hopes are rising for the 
stabilizing force of  the northeastern neighbors—
and especially China—within the greater Central 
Asian region.
The aim of  this analysis is to examine the founda-
tion of  these hopes. More concretely, the analysis 
intends to shed light on the impact of  China’s 
engagement in post-Soviet Central Asia, to discuss 
the extent to which its functioning in the past 
two decades was effectively conducive to regional 
security, and finally to draw the relevant conclu-
sions about its potential role in Afghanistan.4 
This paper’s main focus shall be the relationship 
between Central Asia’s post-Soviet governments 
and their respective societies. As will be argued 
below, the nature of  this relationship is an essen-
tial determinant in building security—or fostering 
insecurity—in this region. To this end, Part I will 
address state-society relations in Central Asia and 
discuss their relevance with regard to the growing 
responsiveness of  the traditionally secular societies 
to alternative—Islamic—forms of  social and politi-
cal organization. Subsequently, Part II will turn to 
China’s role in this relationship, discussing Beijing’s 
interests and ambitions in Central Asia as well as its 
methods of  promoting them. Finally, the implica-
tions of  China’s functioning will be compiled in 
Part III, which will reflect on the People’s Repub-
lic’s stabilizing potential in and beyond the newly 
independent region.
Part I: Central Asia: The State and 
Society
The Roots of Insecurity …
The sudden departure of  the Soviet Union and the 
ensuing “prize” of  political independence came 
as a surprise to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajiki-
stan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—the five new 
republics of  post-Soviet Central Asia. It left the 
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region’s well-indoctrinated population devoid of  a 
unifying ideology that during Soviet times had reli-
ably provided guidance on social, political, and even 
spiritual questions.5 What is more, independence 
also put the region’s leaders into an organizational 
state of  insecurity, depriving them of  long-estab-
lished and well-known (supra-regional) institutional 
structures.6 Thus, independence brought a kind of  
ideological as well as organizational “vacuum” to 
Central Asia’s new states, precipitating a diametrical 
opposition between the needs of  those governed 
and those governing. The former—”a populace that 
suffered from ‘post-Soviet ideological disorder’”—
yearned for the resurrection of  their previously 
suppressed Islamic heritage as well as for socio-
economic development, which required the funda-
mental transformation of  the region’s political and 
economic structures.7 Yet, the region’s new leaders, 
all former members of  the Soviet nomenclature, set 
their focus on “political stability”—the maintenance 
of  control over state resources and society, and 
consequently the absence of  effective transforma-
tion of  any kind.8 Eventually, this discrepancy of  
demands created one significant cause of  today’s 
insecurity: a state of  alienation and distrust between 
Central Asia’s citizens and their governments.9
That such a development would take place, however, 
was not necessarily foreseeable in the early 1990s. 
Indeed, the breakdown of  the communist and only 
officially atheist Soviet Union was absorbed by a 
much-anticipated Islamic revival in Central Asia 
which took place across all strata of  the region’s 
population.10 Initially endorsed and even promoted 
by the governments, the region’s Islamic heritage 
became an important building block in the process 
of  post-Soviet self-discovery, historiography, and 
nation building. Often conceptualized as societal 
“archaization” or “indigenization,” Central Asia’s 
peoples were allowed to return to their Islamic tra-
ditions, to harness the newly acquired freedom of  
religious practice and life, as well as to re-integrate 
with the greater Muslim community.11
However, as the proliferation (and attractiveness) 
of  Islam advanced in the newly independent 
states, the governments’ stance toward religion 
changed; it was increasingly perceived as a threat 
to state authority, and with it, to the consolida-
tion of  genuine secularity.12 In this regard, the 
Tajik civil war (1992–1997) as well as the Taliban’s 
siege of  Afghanistan in 1996 proved a watershed 
for the governments’ relationship with Islam—to 
the extent that their initial endorsement turned 
into anxiety, suspicion, and soon the suppression 
of  all independent (i. e. not state-controlled) reli-
gious activity.13 Thenceforth, and in a very Soviet 
fashion, religion became the subject of  Central 
Asia’s post-Soviet states. National Islamic offices 
were again assigned in close cooperation with the 
governments; recommendations (or even instruc-
tions) on the part of  the authorities for themes to 
be discussed during weekly sermons were brought 
back into use; state control was re-introduced in 
matters of  religious education and information.14 
Invasive state interference—notably in Uzbekistan 
but also, increasingly, in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan—has discredited the reputation of  
most government-approved religious officials and, 
indeed, of  “official Islam” as a whole, forcing even 
ordinary observant believers underground—again.15
The disparity between the popular demand for reli-
gious freedom and its restriction by governments 
has gone hand in hand with the disparity between 
the societies’ hope for socio-economic develop-
ment and the political and economic trajectories 
chosen by Central Asia’s post-Soviet regimes. To be 
sure, some governments initially welcomed Western 
engagement in the region and opted to adjust some 
aspects of  their polities to then prevailing Zeitgeist 
of  privatization, deregulation, liberalization, and, 
not last, democratization.16 However, the govern-
ments’ enthusiasm for Western-promoted struc-
tural change was weaker than their Soviet-inherited 
goal of  “political stability”—the control over state 
resources and society as well as the avoidance of  
risks in all aspects of  political life, or in short, the 
maintenance of  the political status quo. As a result, 
by the turn of  the century, Central Asia’s transition 
process—where present— petered out, bringing to 
the fore a mixture of  Soviet authoritarian and tra-
ditional local political practices, in some cases with 
Western-informed nuances.17
Today, these governance structures represent an 
integral part of  the region’s polities. Best character-
ized as “patrimonial-authoritarian,” Central Asia’s 
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regimes combine the formal, bureaucratic sphere 
of  modern presidential-authoritarian systems with 
the informal, traditionalist functioning of  non-
institutionalized networks, so-called clans. Officially, 
the region’s presidents thus control their repub-
lics’ parliaments, parties, economic resources, and 
key industries. In reality, however, their power is 
limited by special interest groups, which revolve 
around traditional local kinship ties, former Soviet 
comrades cliques, and new, post-Soviet business 
circles.18 The presidents’ core, if  informal, duty is 
to manage the often rivaling factions—to create a 
certain “balance of  power” between them—as well 
as to ensure their loyalty and support vis-à-vis the 
regime. This is implemented through the allocation 
of  privileged positions within government agencies 
and the state’s key industries. Thus, Central Asia’s 
tax and custom agencies, border guards, security 
apparatuses, banking systems, as well as industries 
related to raw materials and other strategic indus-
tries are all deeply penetrated by so-called “vested 
interests”: members of  elitist circles that operate 
hand in hand with the region’s rulers.19
These patrimonial-authoritarian structures depend 
for their survival on the constant inflow of  rents as 
well as on the absence of  civil and political liberties. 
Indeed, the highly lucrative alliance between presi-
dents and “vested interests” can only be sustained, 
firstly, if  there are enough economic resources to 
be redistributed among the key actors to maintain 
their political loyalty; and secondly, if  the effective 
political participation and representation of  those 
excluded from the state’s distributional channels 
is suppressed. In other words and to a significant 
extent, Central Asian governance may be regarded 
as an “alternative system of  profit, power, and pro-
tection” that serves the interests of  various local 
groups at the expense of  the majority population.20
A prominent feature of  such governance is 
“growth without development”—the government’s 
failure to provide public services, to meet the 
fundamental material needs of  its population.21 
Indeed, during the past decades, the region has 
encountered a considerable inflow of  foreign capi-
tal (through investments, credits, and aid), which 
made itself  felt in solid growth rates as well as 
in a slight elevation of  the consumption-related 
standard of  living.22 In spite of  this, however, the 
post-Soviet governments have been systemati-
cally underperforming in their provision of  such 
basic services as education, (affordable) health care, 
social protection, and adequate housing—to name 
a few. The same is true in the realm of  basic infra-
structure, from schools and hospitals to roads.23 
This is because twenty years after independence, 
the Soviet-era resources in existential sectors like 
healthcare, education, energy, and transport have 
been almost exhausted while little new has been 
put in their place. As the International Crisis 
Group puts it, the “post-independence regimes 
made little effort to maintain or replace either [of  
the Soviet human and infrastructure resources], 
and funds allocated for this purpose have largely 
been eaten up by corruption.”24
In short, repression and socio-economic exclusion 
have been maintained as features of  the post-Soviet 
era and continue to serve the region’s “political sta-
bility”—the survival of  Central Asia’s patrimonial-
authoritarian regimes. These circumstances have 
long been nurturing feelings of  alienation among 
the region’s citizens toward their governments, 
bringing about the crumbling of  Central Asia’s 
post-Soviet stability on the ground—or, rather, of  
its surface appearance.25
… and Their Consequences
The failure of  Central Asia’s post-Soviet govern-
ments to build genuinely inclusive nations and 
functioning states, to provide effective institutional 
mechanisms to voice discontent and opposition, 
and to deliver genuine socio-economic progress 
across all parts of  society has been fueling popular 
disappointment and anger. These, during the past 
decade, have pushed some parts of  the populace 
into the extra-legal sphere that advocates violence, 
while heightening the receptiveness of  others to 
alternative, religiously informed models of  social 
and political organization.
As for the former, since 2005, the region has 
encountered constant and ever more frequent 
eruptions of  violence.26 Kyrgyzstan was the setting 
of  two “revolutions” (in 2005 and 2010), more 
appropriately described, however, as violent reshuf-
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fling of  interest groups under the guise of  political 
change.27 Also in 2010, the country’s south was 
the setting for highly violent inter-ethnic clashes 
that left more than four hundred people dead 
and entailed a massive destruction of  property as 
well as extensive displacement of  ethnic minori-
ties.28 Uzbekistan, in 2005, witnessed highly violent 
clashes between government-affiliated security 
services and the (unarmed) civilian population in 
Andijan, which, according to international sources, 
led to the death of  at least four hundred people.29 
In Tajikistan, since the most recent military opera-
tions in the country’s eastern Gorno-Badakshan 
Autonomous Province (GBAO), protestors, espe-
cially young people with little experience of  the 
country’s civil war, have started to look actively 
for confrontation with the authorities and police 
forces.30 Even previously utterly stable Kazakhstan 
has been shaken by unrest. In late 2011, police 
fired on unarmed demonstrators at an industrial 
strike killing at least 16 and injuring more than one 
hundred people, marking a negative watershed in 
the relations between the Kazakh government and 
its people.31 Moreover, Central Asia’s most prosper-
ous country has encountered a “rising terror threat,” 
counting ten incidents of  violence (from suicide 
bombings to random explosions) and a total death 
toll of  more than fifty people since May 2011.32
At the same time, the population’s growing alien-
ation from their governments has brought to the 
fore a more subtle yet also further-reaching dimen-
sion of  insecurity. The region’s traditionally secular 
populations are showing heightened receptiveness 
toward alternative models of  social and political 
organization. This has manifested itself  in a second, 
more  community-oriented wave of  post-Soviet 
Islamic revival (as distinguished from the first wave 
in the immediate aftermath of  Soviet disintegration, 
which had a more cultural-spiritual focus). Thus, 
for the past decade, a variety of  social and political 
Islamic movements have been sprouting up in Cen-
tral Asia, becoming an integral (if, due to repres-
sion, unofficial and often illegal) part of  many 
Central Asians’ lives. By and large, their presence 
represents a response to government failure, to the 
inherent inadequacy of  socio-economic develop-
ment, and to the societies’ disenchantment with the 
prevailing political-ideological impasse.33
The more prominent movements of  a social, 
welfare-oriented character in Central Asia include, 
among others, the Jama’at al Tabligh as well as 
local- and foreign-sponsored Islamic charities such 
as Adap Bashaty and the Turkish Diyanet.34 In 
addition to (moderate) spiritual guidance, these 
organizations provide vital social, educational, and 
at times even economic assistance to those parts 
of  society that have been (or feel) neglected by 
the local political structures. In a region beset by 
the absence of  the rule of  law, these groups offer 
authentic (Islamic) norms, guidelines, and rules, 
thus helping to establish intra-communal networks 
that endeavor to effectively meet the social and eco-
nomic needs neglected by the governments.35 This 
kind of  Islamic dissemination is a phenomenon that 
can be widely observed in Central Asia, especially in 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. While, by and large, a 
product of  Central Asia’s political failure, this kind 
of  activism is solely focused on welfare and com-
munity, and does not pursue political aims.36
This is different for radical Islamic (Islamist) move-
ments at the other, political, end of  the process of  
Islamic revival. These movements are characterized 
by the conjunction of  religion and politics, and 
often, they denounce the welfare-oriented aspects 
of  the moderate, non-political groups. Indeed, 
these movements regard themselves as exclusively 
political organizations, endeavoring to break-up 
Central Asia’s secular governments and to establish 
a region-wide political-religious entity that unites 
all Muslims based on Islamic law.37 The most noted 
groups in this regard are the Islamic Movement of  
Uzbekistan (IMU) as well as Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT), 
the Islamic Party of  Liberation.
IMU is a militant organization that since 1998 has 
been pursuing the overthrow of  the Uzbek regime 
and the creation of  an Islamic state.38 In 2001, it 
is said to have transformed itself  into the Islamic 
Party of  Turkestan, highlighting its goal of  “inte-
grating” the greater Central Asian region (Kazakh-
stan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbeki-
stan, and China’s Xinjiang province) into a state 
called Turkestan.39 American post-09/11 military 
operations in Afghanistan have dealt a severe, albeit 
probably only temporary, blow to its operational 
and organizational capabilities, killing its leader 
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Juma Namangani and driving the remaining mem-
bers into the tribal areas of  the Pakistani-Afghan 
border. Since 2009, however, regional observers 
have been worrying about the return of  IMU or 
IMU-affiliated guerrillas—mostly disenchanted 
young men responding to government repression 
and the lack of  economic prospects—fighting 
alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan and their 
potential re-orientation toward Central Asia, Tajiki-
stan and Uzbekistan in particular.40
In contrast to the IMU, which advocates violence, 
the Hizb ut-Tahrir movement (HT) is—according to 
own statements—pacifist. It regards itself  as a politi-
cal party whose ideology is exclusively based upon 
Islam. This organization seeks to “Islamize society 
from the bottom up” so as to re-instate the Khilafat-
e-Rashida (the Rightly-Guided Caliphate) that existed 
in the seventh century under Prophet Mohammed.41 
HT is banned from official life throughout Central 
Asia, where it operates through clandestine networks 
and cells. According to Emmanuel Karagiannis, 
the organization counts about 25,000 “hard-core 
members and many more sympathizers” in the 
region, with traditionally devout Uzbeks (either from 
Uzbekistan or Uzbek-populated areas of  Kyrgyz-
stan and Tajikistan) accounting for the majority of  
followers.42 The movement’s popularity is rooted 
in its promise of  peaceful yet radical political and 
social change—the establishment of  a just society 
governed by sharia, not man-made laws. Accordingly, 
HT adjusts its strategy to each country’s socio- 
economic and political context, constructing some-
thing like a “local Islamist ideology” that takes up 
the individual grievances of  the target population 
and demonstrates how religion may be applied in 
order to resolve them.43
The attractiveness of  radical Islamic groupings is 
directly linked to the quality of  the relationship 
between the state and society.44 In other words, it is 
the extent of  political and religious repression on 
the ground—and with it, the extent of  alienation 
between the state and society—that is decisive for 
Islamism to take hold. Indeed, evidence on the 
ground shows that whenever a political framework 
allows for the possibility of  voicing opposition and 
dissent—however limited—people tend to abstain 
from the (violent or non-violent) politicization of  
Islam.45 For this reason, radical groups are some-
what less popular in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan 
(at least among ethnic Kyrgyz and Kazakh), where 
welfare-oriented groups still have the upper hand. 
Conversely, where the possibility of  participation 
is non-existent, radical Islam is regarded as “the 
only real opposition to autocratic and repressive 
regimes,” triggering, in turn, ever harsher responses 
on the part of  the governments—to the point of  a 
fully-grown vicious cycle of  repression and radical-
ization.46 This appears to be increasingly the case in 
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.
This “second wave” of  Islamic revival in Central 
Asia coincides with the final security- and state-
building processes being implemented across the 
border in Afghanistan by the NATO-led Interna-
tional Security Assistance Force (ISAF). It has the 
potential to obliterate the ideological-organizational 
boundaries between traditionally secular Central 
Asia and Islamist-shattered Afghanistan and thus 
become a security risk for the greater region. Indeed, 
in conjunction with further socio-economic hard-
ship, government repression, and growing radical 
propaganda, this wave may, to quote Sébastien Pey-
rouse, facilitate “the transformation of  Islam into 
an ideology of  resistance” against a secularist world 
order “considered unjust because it is impious.”47 In 
any case, the present revival could create a mind-set 
among the broad population that sympathizes, or 
at least is indifferent, to political or even militant 
Islam’s infiltration of  the post-Soviet space. This 
in turn would render Central Asia a hub for radical 
ideology and activism—and hence a source of  pro-
nounced regional and international insecurity.48
To conclude this section, a large proportion of  
Central Asia’s issues of  insecurity—from sudden 
eruptions of  violence to the embedding of  radi-
cal Islamist ideas in the region—is the result of  
a relationship of  alienation and distrust between 
Central Asia’s peoples and their governments, and 
stems from the region’s authoritarian and patrimo-
nial structures. Above all, the current developments 
reflect the citizens’ renunciation of  the incumbent 
regimes, which, functioning within their fenced-off  
structures, have failed to provide socio-economic 
development and a post-Soviet political-ideological 
vision that, as Karagiannis writes, “could inspire 
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hope for a better future.”49 In consequence, Cen-
tral Asia’s effective potential for insecurity—the 
local permeability for, and eventual establishment 
of, militant Islam in the region—may be regarded 
as a function of  the extent of  political-religious 
repression, that is, of  the extent of  state-society 
alienation, on the ground. It is against this back-
ground that the functioning of  a silent, yet highly 
significant external actor in Central Asia’s domestic 
politics, the People’s Republic of  China, shall be 
reviewed in the next part.
Part II: Chinese Policy in Central 
Asia: Stability above All?
Beijing’s involvement in Central Asia dates back 
to 1989, when it entered into negotiations on the 
delineation and demilitarization of  the then heavily 
fortified Sino-Soviet frontier, which encompassed 
the Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Tajik Republics. After 
the dissolution of  the Soviet Union, talks contin-
ued bilaterally between Beijing and the respective 
governments of  the newly independent states.50 
The formation of  a sound bilateral basis, however, 
was tainted by the outbreak of  unrest in Xinjiang, 
a province on China’s northwestern frontier and 
home to a large Uighur minority that shares ethnic, 
religious, and cultural ties with the Central Asian 
peoples.51 The collapse of  the Soviet Union and 
the ensuing independence of  the former titular 
republics substantially encouraged existent separat-
ist tendencies in the Chinese province, leading to 
the outbreak of  a series of  riots during the early 
1990s. This circumstance dramatically raised the 
significance of  Central Asia to the government in 
Beijing, which suspected that the newly indepen-
dent republics sympathized with the Uighurs’ drive 
for independence and played an important part in 
their mobilization.52
It is against this background that China developed 
an approach toward Central Asia that not only 
sought to promote the peaceful accommodation 
on border issues but also, crucially, focused on 
introducing and asserting its own position on the 
“Xinjiang problem.”53 To this end, Beijing embarked 
on a neighborhood policy that combined the newly 
independent states’ core interests of  economic 
development and political stability with its own 
security needs, aiming for the establishment of  
mutually beneficial, and hence reliable, Sino- 
Central Asian relations.
Economic Development
China’s first official act in the economic realm was 
to establish a straightforward link between the 
newly independent republics’ desire for develop-
ment and their discontinuation of  Central Asia’s 
support for the Uighur separatist cause. Beijing 
presented Central Asia’s new leaders with a fun-
damental quid pro quo “in which strict control … 
over the activities of  their citizens with respect to 
Xinjiang [were] rewarded with concrete benefits in 
the areas of  trade and investment.”54 This method 
effectively tied the hands of  the economically weak 
and cooperation-seeking post-Soviet governments, 
compelling them to suppress Uighur activism in 
their own countries. In exchange, Chinese engage-
ment in the realms of  trade, finance, and invest-
ment has progressed at a previously unimagined 
pace, carrying significant benefits for both sides.
Trade between Central Asia and China has been 
growing exponentially, developing from a practi-
cally non-existent trade volume in 1991 to 23 
billion dollars in 2010.55 To Beijing, a large manu-
facturer of  inexpensive goods, gaining access to 
Central Asia’s new and unsaturated (if  small) mar-
kets proved a profitable undertaking, as its price 
structure endowed it with a comparative advantage 
vis-à-vis Western, Turkish, and even Russian goods. 
Its products, sold through official channels or the 
semi-official “shuttle trade,” have fully met the 
impoverished majority’s demand for affordable 
everyday products on the one hand, and “the grow-
ing technology-related consumption [needs] of  the 
middle classes” on the other, rendering China one 
of  the main trade partners of  the region today.56 
Beijing also became an important creditor to all of  
the republics, granting extensive buyers’ credits to 
the region’s poorest states and, whenever deemed 
opportune, individual loans on short notice.57
What is more, as a net importer of  hydropower 
and hydrocarbons, China has used its relationship 
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with energy-abundant Central Asia firstly, to chan-
nel electricity to Xinjiang (which is underserved 
with hydropower) and secondly, to moderate its 
dependence on the traditional Middle Eastern 
hydrocarbon suppliers and the respective, US-con-
trolled, supply routes.58 Thus, the People’s Republic 
has been highly engaged in creating new hydroelec-
tric plants as well as eastern- and southern-directed 
electricity grids operating partly in Kazakhstan and 
especially in water-abundant Tajikistan and Kyr-
gyzstan.59 Beijing has also invested heavily into the 
energy industries of  Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, 
the region’s respective oil and gas champions, turn-
ing their export focus toward the east.60 Finally, it 
initiated the building of  eastward-oriented trans-
port infrastructure, with the aim of  restoring the 
region’s historic significance as a transport hub for 
greater Eurasian trade.61
In general, Sino-Central Asian economic coopera-
tion has been an important motor for the region’s 
post-Soviet economic development. The consider-
able growth rates, the expansion of  regional trans-
port infrastructure and extraction industry, as well 
as the slight elevation of  the post-Soviet standard 
of  living through the provision of  affordable con-
sumer goods may all, to various degrees, be attrib-
uted to China’s engagement. Beijing’s presence in 
Central Asia also offered new employment oppor-
tunities to the post-Soviet populace, notably in the 
realm of  intra-regional re-exportation of  Chinese 
goods (“shuttle trade”) as well as through the pro-
vision of  work opportunities in China for Central 
Asian academics, thanks to student and professional 
exchange programs.62 Moreover, China’s economic 
presence in the post-Soviet region had significant 
spillover effects in the political realm, promoting 
within the Central Asian governments a previously 
unfamiliar sense of  political self-determination. 
Indeed, Sino-Central Asian cooperation has helped 
to alleviate the new republics’ dependence upon 
the old (partly decaying and almost exclusively 
Moscow-oriented) Soviet infrastructure and also 
strengthened their negotiation position vis-à-vis 
Russia’s post-imperial economic ambitions in the 
region.63
At the same time, however, Beijing’s engagement 
has done little to encourage urgently needed eco-
nomic reforms on the part of  Central Asia’s gov-
ernments. Quite the opposite, China’s significant, 
yet largely unconditional, financial transfers—be 
it through infrastructure investments or conces-
sional loans—have largely obliterated the acute 
necessity to reform and diversify the region’s 
economies, while providing resources that fostered 
the region’s destructive regimes.64 This, in turn, has 
not only heightened the danger of  the “resource 
curse,” especially in Central Asia’s hydrocarbon-
abundant countries.65 It has also forestalled the 
development of  local know-how, hampering the 
urgently needed advancement of  the economies’ 
secondary and tertiary sectors.66 As a consequence, 
this kind of  cooperation dramatically increased the 
newly independent republics’ dependence on the 
continued inflow of  manufactured goods, capital, 
and also goodwill from China. Thus, in addition to 
endorsing ultimately insecurity-fostering structures, 
Sino-Central Asian cooperation put the matter of  
national development to a disproportional extent 
out of  the latter governments’ hands, binding them 
to follow Beijing’s, and not necessarily national, 
interests. From this perspective, and especially if  
taking a long-term view, China’s economic engage-
ment may be considered to have been rather 
obstructive to Central Asia’s sustainable socio-eco-
nomic development, and hence to the emergence 
of  viable state-society relations as a whole.
Regional Stability
Beijing complemented its economic quid pro quo 
with a multilateral, normatively-informed strat-
egy that focused on persuading the Central Asian 
regimes into compliance with China’s regional secu-
rity objectives. This proved enormously successful 
because Beijing, to paraphrase Jia Qingguo, came 
up with a vision of  regional security that appealed 
not only to itself  but also to the nations that 
were supposed to be led.67 This vision manifested 
itself  in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
(SCO), a regional intergovernmental organiza-
tion that includes the Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Tajik, and 
Uzbek Republics as well as Russia and China as its 
members.68 The SCO has been set to promote the 
maintenance of  regional security, understood as the 
suppression of  the “three evils of  terrorism, sepa-
ratism, and extremism” as well as, somewhat less 
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stringently, the containment of  drug and weapon 
trafficking in the region.69 In this regard, the notion 
of  the “three evils” has been taken from China’s 
domestic security discourse, where it is regularly 
applied to Uighur matters, as well as other issues of  
government-felt insecurity. Within the SCO, in turn, 
it has served as an instrument to mutualize Chi-
nese security needs with those of  the post-Soviet 
states—to repack (some selected) Central Asian 
issues of  insecurity into Chinese terminology and 
thus establish a collective understanding of  what 
constitutes a regional security threat.70
With the “three evils,” Beijing introduced a dis-
course on regional security that not only reflected 
its own needs, but also took heed of  the chief  
concern of  Central Asia’s patrimonial-authoritarian 
regimes: survival. Indeed, the mutualization of  
threat perceptions was greatly facilitated by the 
post-Soviet governments’ understanding of  “stabil-
ity” as control over state resources and society as 
well as the absence of  risks in any aspects of  politi-
cal life—or, as pointed out above, the maintenance 
of  the political status quo. The decisive common 
denominator on both sides was thus the desire to 
frame any unwelcome domestic activism—be it 
from Uighurs, Islamists, or members of  any move-
ment of  a generally oppositional nature—as an 
outgrowth of  “terrorism, separatism, and extrem-
ism,” that is, as a threat to the stability of  national 
governments and, in turn, to regional security as a 
whole.71
And indeed, this is what SCO representatives have 
been doing since the region’s surface stability tilted 
in 2005: that year’s Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyz-
stan and the Andijan incident in Uzbekistan have 
effectively served as templates for subsequent cat-
egorization of  the region’s “three evils,” leading to 
the establishment of  the linkage between civil (anti-
regime) activism and extremism.72 Zhang Deguang, 
the SCO’s first secretary general, provided highly 
informative insight into how the SCO member 
states understood regional “security” and intended 
to apply (and benefit from) the notion of  the 
“three evils” when he took the “disturbing” Kyrgyz 
revolution as evidence for the urgency to further 
suppress extremist forces.73 Even more illustrative 
of  this attitude was the SCO’s explicit endorse-
ment of  the Uzbek government’s crackdown on 
protestors in Andjian in May 2005. During this 
incident Uzbek security services are reported to 
have deliberately fired on protesting civilians, lead-
ing to the deaths of  at least four hundred people. 
Western governments, organizations, and media 
have referred to the event as a “massacre” of  
unarmed civilians.74 The official Uzbek position, 
however, sanctioned the security services, calling 
their action a legitimate law enforcement opera-
tion directed at “Islamic extremists, criminals, and 
bandits” who sought to destabilize and eventually 
overthrow the country’s government.75 In contrast 
to the international community, the fellow SCO 
member states expressed solidarity with the Uzbek 
government, condemned the incident as an act of  
terrorism and extremism, and were prepared to 
offer help to restore the country’s “security.”76 Only 
two weeks after the incident, President Islam Kari-
mov was solemnly received in Beijing by Hu Jintao, 
who used the occasion to reiterate the Chinese 
government’s favorable opinion of  the Uzbek gov-
ernment’s measures. He welcomed these “efforts 
in safeguarding national independence, sovereignty 
and territorial integrity” and assured his authori-
tarian counterpart of  the “common interest in 
[further] safeguarding regional peace, stability and 
security” by “jointly cracking down on the ‘three 
evils forces.’”77
The establishment of  a collective understanding of  
(in)security went hand in hand with the establish-
ment of  an intra-organizational code of  conduct, 
in which the principle of  “non-interference into 
the internal affairs of  a state” figured most promi-
nently.78 The SCO member states, to be sure, fol-
lowed the international definition of  “interference” 
as “the threat or use of  force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of  any state,” 
ranging from military intervention to more subtle 
interference in political activities, support for seces-
sion, and so-called “regime change.”79 However, 
they flavored this principle with the addendum of  
“respect for diversity of  [political] cultures,” estab-
lishing the linkage between “non-interference” and 
the “right” to autonomously choose one’s “own 
path of  development.”80 This position resonated 
well with China’s overall foreign policy approach, 
which stipulates that no single model of  (social and 
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political) development fits all; that each country 
should choose its individual development route; 
and that “outsiders should not interfere.”81
Hence, “non-interference,” as put forward by 
China and applied within the SCO, would be best 
understood as the unequivocal rejection of  the 
“export of  foreign models of  social development,” 
as SCO member states put it.82 Such statements are 
generally directed at those (usually Western) nations 
interested in promoting political transformation in 
Central Asia—”the cause at the root to instability 
around the world,” according to an “authoritative” 
Chinese analysis.83 Against this background, the 
SCO’s amalgamation of  “non-interference” with 
“respect for diversity” and developmental individu-
alism may be regarded as serving the purpose of  
“protective integration”: it provides a normatively 
charged shield against international pressure on 
Central Asia’s patrimonial-authoritarian govern-
ments and thus endeavors to legitimize domestic 
policies internally and externally so as protect the 
region’s political status quo.84
To conclude: much as it has in the economic realm, 
Beijing has used the premise of  regional security to 
push through a political quid pro quo in which, to 
paraphrase Graham Fuller, Central Asian govern-
ments’ strict control of  Uighur activism within 
their territories has been rewarded with implicit 
support for the region’s regimes.85 This has been 
achieved by matching Chinese security terminol-
ogy to the patrimonial-authoritarian governments’ 
threat perceptions (linking the “three evils” of  Chi-
nese security discourse to Central Asia’s domestic 
anti-regime activism). Beijing’s explicit backing of  
the Central Asian’s core domestic interest—regime 
survival—further increased the authoritarian repub-
lics’ dependence on China, annihilating the merest 
leeway for the region’s leaders to disregard its needs. 
By and large, and for the governments involved, 
this policy has proved an outstanding success. Thus, 
during the past decade, all of  the region’s newly 
independent republics have unequivocally rallied 
behind China’s security needs. In their territories, 
they have restricted all social and political activity 
related to Xinjiang’s independence as well as to 
China’s treatment of  Uighurs.86 At the same time, 
Central Asia’s governance structures—and with it, 
the condition of  state-society relations—have been 
further consolidated; the region has re-emerged as 
a secure stronghold for patrimonial, authoritarian 
governance.87 It is at precisely this point that the 
linkage between the People’s Republic’s engage-
ment in Central Asia and the region’s growing 
 insecurity comes into play.
Part III: State-Society Relations in 
Central Asia: The Chinese Factor
China regards its engagement in Central Asia 
through the prism of  a “harmonious world,” a 
notion with roots in its Taoist and Confucian 
heritage that advocates a conduct in international 
relations “that respect[s] each other’s national 
sovereignty, tolerate[s] diversity (in national politi-
cal systems and values), and promotes national 
development.”88 More concretely, Beijing likes to 
present its engagement in the region as a “policy 
of  bringing harmony, security, and prosperity to 
neighbors, … [dedicated to strengthening] mutual 
trust and cooperation …, easing up hot-spot ten-
sions, and striving to maintain peace and tranquility 
in Asia.”89 In order to evaluate the effective impact 
of  this high-sounding neighborhood policy and 
determine Beijing’s objective role in the region’s 
security framework, it is of  use to recall the root 
of  a significant part of  Central Asia’s insecurity: 
the patrimonial-authoritarian form of  governance 
and the ensuing alienation and distrust that exists 
between the citizens and their states.
Since entering the region, Beijing has sought 
to accommodate the core interests of  the very 
regimes that have been responsible for Central 
Asia’s political, economic, and social decay in order 
to ensure compliance with Chinese security inter-
ests as well as to tap into the region’s consider-
able raw materials and infrastructure development 
projects. The strategy has been to establish vari-
ous institutional mechanisms that would provide 
wealth and security maximization for the region’s 
patrimonial-authoritarian structures, and to thus 
create a strong, self-monitoring dependency on 
Beijing—especially with regard to Uighur activism. 
And indeed, as demonstrated above, these targets 
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have been met. Sino-Central-Asian economic coop-
eration increased windfalls for the region’s govern-
ments—from investments to concessional credits—
bolstering their economic base. In the realm of  
security, Beijing established a collective discourse 
that allowed practically any anti-regime activism to 
be framed as a threat to regional stability and also 
helped to fend off  international criticism through 
its particular understanding of  “non-interference.” 
This further assisted Central Asia’s patrimonial-
authoritarian governments’ survival. In return, the 
region’s governments committed themselves to 
upholding Beijing’s security needs in Xinjiang.
In other words, the promotion of  Chinese interests 
in Central Asia has been accompanied by the provi-
sion of  institutional and dialectic mechanisms that 
have played into the hands of  post-Soviet Central 
Asia’s authoritarian, insecurity-fostering regimes. 
These mechanisms have also played into the hands 
of  the very radical Islamic elements that, alongside 
the region’s elites, have become the main benefi-
ciaries of  Central Asia’s dysfunctional political-
economic and social structures. To re-emphasize: in 
post-Soviet, traditionally secular Central Asia, the 
appeal of  politicized Islam is directly linked to the 
relative degree of  repression, and thus to the extent 
of  state-society alienation on the ground. Through 
its engagement in the region—and by catering to 
the incumbent governments’ needs—China has 
been actively exacerbating this already highly prob-
lematic relationship between the states and their cit-
izens. It has not only helped indirectly to foster the 
population’s disposition toward alternative models 
of  social and political organization, but it has also 
widened the window of  opportunity for radical, 
extremist forces. Thus, Beijing has supported the 
consolidation of  the very problem that it officially 
has sought to abolish.
Seen against this background, China’s manner of  
functioning in Central Asia, instead of  reflecting a 
policy of  genuine “harmony, security and prosper-
ity,” may be considered a rather opportunist adjust-
ment to the preferences of  the region’s regimes 
in order to maximize its own advantage. Indeed, 
promoting effective security in Central Asia would 
require the very opposite of  China’s policy—the 
discontinuation of  the region’s extant system of  
patrimonial-authoritarian governance and a trans-
formation of  state-society relations. In concrete 
terms, it would require the restoration of  societal 
trust in the secular regimes, notably through genu-
ine political and socio-economic inclusion of  the 
majority population and the resultant legitimacy 
on the part of  the incumbent governments. This 
state of  affairs is unattainable unless China effec-
tively withdraws its support for the region’s pres-
ent regimes. However, such an about-face would 
endanger Chinese security needs and also possibly 
deprive Beijing of  the considerable political advan-
tage vis-à-vis its geopolitical competitors in the 
region. In other words, to China, a neighborhood 
policy directed at the genuine—structural—stabili-
zation of  Central Asia would not be an option due 
to the inherent tensions with its domestic interests.
The ensuing conclusion with regard to China’s 
stabilizing potential in and beyond post-Soviet 
Central Asia is accordingly disenchanting. The 
People’s Republic has been engaged in Central Asia 
for more than two decades. During this time, it has 
actively helped to consolidate the region’s politi-
cal regimes that are, to a great extent, responsible 
for the societies’ departure from their traditionally 
secular stance. The main point, in the end, is that 
Afghanistan is not the only threat to the security 
of  the greater region. The post-Soviet regimes also 
carry their share of  responsibility in this regard, 
as does China. According to Andrew Stroehlein, 
“embracing … [Central Asian] dictatorships is no 
way to bring security to Afghanistan.”90 Quite the 
opposite; it is, potentially, an effective way to forfeit 
the ideological boundaries within greater Central 
Asia—with corresponding implications for security 
in and around Afghanistan, especially after the 
withdrawal of  ISAF. This fact should be borne in 
mind when thinking about, and hoping for, Bei-
jing’s enhanced engagement in this region.
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